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Imre Lakatos’ impressive historiographical methodology has
served as the foundation of several works in the history of sci-
ence. The method is closely related to his philosophy of science,
the so called methodology of scientific research programmes.
This paper attempts to provide a criticism of the Lakatosian
method by providing a detailed analysis of a historical case
study from the field of the history of economic thought, namely
Philip Mirowski’s thesis concerning the impact of physics on
the marginalist revolution in economics. I will reconstruct
Mirowski’s reconstruction explicitly in Lakatosian terms and
show that the consistent application of Lakatos’ historiography
leads to contradictions.
Keywords
philosophy of science · history of science · historiography ·
Imre Lakatos · rational reconstruction · history of economic
thoughts
Gergely Ko˝hegyi
Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest, 1117 Budapest,
Pázmány Péter sétány 1/A, Hungary
e-mail: gkohe@elte.hu
“Philosophy of science without history of science is
empty; history of science without philosophy of science is
blind” [14, 102]
Introduction
How should we interpret the first sentence of Lakatos’ [14]
a paraphrase of Kant’s famous dictum? Is it worth the trou-
ble reviewing the methodology of scientific and historiograph-
ical research programmes 40 years after their first publication?
Especially in light of the fact that there have been works with
case histories of particular sciences using Lakatos’ methodol-
ogy. Furthermore, what is the difference between a historically
sensitive “theory of scientific rationality” [14, p 103] and other
philosophical concepts of science from the viewpoint of a histo-
rian? The paper attempts to answer these questions.
In Imre Lakatos’ theory of appraisal history of science plays
a key role. In particular, he suggests that methodologies can be
commensurated and evaluated with the help of history of sci-
ence. In this paper I point out an ambiguity in the Lakatosian
framework that has several consequences regarding the entire
Lakatosian historiography.
Firstly, I shall briefly discuss the role of the history of sci-
ence in the Lakatosian system and outline the main components
of his philosophy of science, which is inevitable for further in-
vestigations. Secondly, I will outline Lakatos’ historiograph-
ical method and analyze the role of history of science in the
Lakatosian framework. Thirdly, I shall illustrate my theoreti-
cal problems with a historical case study from the field of the
history of economic thought. The case study will focus on
Philip Mirowski’s thesis concerning the impact of physics on
the marginalist revolution in the history of economic thought
[20, 21]. I will reconstruct Mirowski’s thesis explicitly in
Lakatosian terms and thus show that several parts of his thesis –
which is based on the Lakatosian historiography – are untenable
exactly because of the Lakatosian methodology. At the end of
this article I shall summarize my findings.
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Methodology of scientific research programmes
Lakatos’ philosophy of science is a ’transitional’ concept be-
tween the theories of scientific rationality – which stem from
the empiricist-positivist tradition – and the post-kuhnian tenden-
cies. Lakatos criticizes both the logical positivist and Poppe-
rian standpoint concerning scientific theories and demarcation
criteria as well as Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s concept of ’over-
emphasizing’ irrational aspects of scientific change. He appre-
ciates Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s historical approach but stays
within the Popperian boundaries because of his conviction re-
garding scientific rationality. Consequently, he intends to gener-
ate a theory of scientific rationality which is free from the short-
comings of his predecessor’s works and in which history of sci-
ence takes a crucial role. At this point we shall briefly discuss
those basic concepts of the Lakatosian framework, which is in-
evitable for further investigations.
The central element, the so called scientific research pro-
gramme is a series of theories that can be appraised in the light
of rational criteria which can also be rationally evaluated. In
relation to the demarcation problem Lakatos mentions:
”It is a succession of theories and not one given theory which
is appraised as scientific or pseudo-scientific. But members of
such series of theories are usually connected by a remarkable
continuity which welds them into research programmes” [13, p
47].
A scientific research programme constitutes a theoretically
progressive problem-shift “if each new theory has some excess
empirical content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some
novel, hitherto unexpected fact” [13, p 34] and in addition it
constitutes an empirically progressive problem-shift “if some of
this excess empirical content is also corroborated, that is, if each
new theory leads us to the actual discovery of some new fact”
[13, p34]. In case of both theoretical and empirical progressiv-
ity the research programme is called progressive, otherwise the
case is labelled as degenerating1.
In a research programme isolated theories are linked by the
positive and negative heuristics. The positive heuristics of the
programme outlines the problems, problem-solving strategies
and procedures to follow, while negative heuristics “tells us what
paths of research to avoid” [13, p 47]. The negative heuristics
delimits the ’hard core’ – another characteristic element of the
research programme – which contains irrefutable principles, as-
sumptions, etc. that can never be modified because of meet-
ing counter-evidences or any other methodological decisions, in
spite of the ’protective belt’ of auxiliary, observational etc. hy-
potheses “which has to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted
and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus
hardened-core” [13, p 48].
Lakatos combines certain elements of conventionalism and
1 More precisely, if the members of the series of theories provide only post-
hoc explanations to empirical facts, then the research programme is called stag-
nant.
falsificationism. The continuity of scientific growth is ’justified’
by accepting spatio-temporally universal theories by convention
instead of accepting singular factual statements. However, the
evaluation of these theories has to be made using “hard Poppe-
rian elements” [14, p 112]. Therefore, the historical research
based on the Lakatosian concept is a “long-extended theoretical
and empirical rivalry of major research programmes, progres-
sive and degenerating problem-shifts, and the slowly emerging
victory of one programme over the other” [14, p 118].
“The most important such series in the growth of science
are characterized by a certain continuity which connects their
members. This continuity evolves from a genuine research pro-
gramme adumbrated at the start” [13, p 47].
That is, the hard core, the positive and negative heuristics of
the programme had been outlined beforehand but they can only
be reconstructed retrospectively. Hence, the Lakatosian history
and historiography of science is closely related to his philosoph-
ical concept.
The role of history of science
History of science in the Lakatosian framework has a double
role. On the one hand it is used as the ’application’ of the phi-
losophy of science, on the other hand it is used for evaluating the
methodologies suggested by the various concepts of the philos-
ophy of science. Let us turn to the first problem, as the second
one is not relevant in this paper.
At first Lakatos argued that “philosophy of science provides
normative methodologies in terms of which the historian recon-
structs ’internal history’ and thereby provides the rational ex-
planation of the growth of knowledge” [14, p 102]Writing an
internal history or rationally reconstructing the history of a sci-
ence often results in forcing our present viewpoint of scientific
problems on the past, i.e. declaring how ’things ought to have
happened’.
“It is not only the (’internal’) succes or the (’internal’) defeat
of a programme which can be judged only with hindsight: it is
frequently also its content” [14, 119].
Certainly all philosophical concepts of science suggest differ-
ent historiographical methodologies and result in different ratio-
nal reconstructions. In practice historians committed to differ-
ent philosophical trends present different accounts on the same
topic. As an illustration considers the most influential „modern
methodologies or logics of discovery” [14, p 103], which out-
line philosophical theories of science as sets of “(possibly not
even tightly knit, let alone mechanical) rules for the appraisal
of ready, articulated theories. Often these rules, or systems of
appraisal serve as ’theories of scientific rationality’, ’demarca-
tion criteria’ or ’definitions of science’.”[14, p 103] The four
methodologies to be analyzed are inductivism, falsificationism,
conventionalism and Lakatos’ own philosophical concept, the
methodology of scientific research programmes.
“The internal history of inductivists consists of alleged dis-
coveries of hard facts and of so-called inductive generalizations.
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The internal history of conventionalists consists of factual dis-
coveries and of the erection of pigeonhole systems and their re-
placement by allegedly simpler ones” [14, p 118]. A ’pigeon-
hole system’ can be any kind of organization of historical facts
into a coherent whole, which is based on a convention. “But
the conventionalist does not regard any pigeonhole system as
provenly true, but only as ’true by convention’ (or possibly even
as neither true nor false)” [14, p 105]. For a conventionalist
historian the ’guiding principle’ of scientific change is the pur-
suit of simplicity and not the growth of ’true-content’. The fal-
sificationist historian emphasizes the significance of falsifiable
theories based on bold conjunctures that are on the one hand
’scientific’, because they can be brought into conflict with a ba-
sic statement, and on the other hand ’content-increasing’, i.e.
they predict ’novel facts’ which are unexpected in the light of
previous knowledge. The logic of falsificationism implies that
the most important historical events are negative crucial experi-
ments2. The significance of these negative crucial experiments
is determined by the significance of the falsified theory.
And, finally, according to the methodology of scientific re-
search programmes „the great scientific achievements are re-
search programmes which can be evaluated in terms of progres-
sive and degenerating problem-shifts; and scientific revolutions
consist of one research programme superseding (overtaking in
progress) another. This methodology offers a new rational re-
construction of science” [14, p 110].
Lakatos combines certain elements of conventionalism and
falsificationism. The continuity of scientific growth is ’justified’
by accepting spatio-temporally universal theories by convention
instead of accepting singular factual statements. But the evalua-
tion of these theories has to be made using „hard Popperian ele-
ments” [14, p 112]. Therefore, historical research based on the
Lakatosian concept is searching for ”long-extended theoretical
and empirical rivalry of major research programmes, progres-
sive and degenerating problem-shifts, and the slowly emerging
victory of one programme over the other” [14].
Lakatos points out that any internal history or rational re-
construction “needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-
psychological) ’external history”’ [14, p 102], the role of which
is to explain those elements of history that cannot be included
in a theory of rationality. The situation of the ’demarcation-
line’ between the external and the internal history depends for
the most part on the chosen methodology. For example the ad-
herence to a falsified theory becomes an irrational external fac-
tor in a history which is based on falsificationist methodology.
But in the case of the methodology of scientific research pro-
grammes a “pigheadedness” and the “modesty” [14, p 113] –
because even if a research programme is lagging behind, may
still stage a comeback – is inherently rational. In addition the
“successful predictions of novel facts (i.e. that a discovery of
a fact preceded or followed a theory) are irrelevant both for
2 A detaild analysis of the role of crucial experiments is Lakatos 1978c.
inductivists and falsificationists, (. . . ) only their logical rela-
tion is decisive” [14, p 114].By contrast, in the methodology
of scientific research programmes these anticipations of novel
facts are indicative of progressivity and constitute with the pri-
ority disputes3the vital part of the internal history. However,
the Lakatosian methodology cannot even explain the different
speeds of development, which are influenced by political or psy-
chological factors. These aspects of development have to be in-
dicated in the footnotes, which are to reconstruct the external
history.
An illustration: the Mirowski thesis
In order to illustrate4 these problems let us now examine a
case study from the field of the history of economic thought. The
Lakatosian historiographical concept is a very popular approach
among historians of economic thought. There are numerous pa-
pers [3, 6, 7, 11,16] and books [4, 18] that advocate applying the
methodology of scientific research programmes. [22] gave an
explanation to this popularity, although the Lakatosian concept
was and has been reconsidered also by historians of economics
(see [1, 2, 8]).
Our case study is centred around two works by Philip
Mirowski [20, 21]. Although Mirowski does not explicitly con-
sider himself a Lakatosian historian, the spirit of Lakatos can
be discovered in the structure of his reasoning. He follows
the methodology of historiographical research programmes in
its very clear form suggested by Lakatos. On the one hand, he
provides a formal reconstruction supplemented by external ex-
planations, and then appraises historical facts based on that re-
construction. As Blaug (2009) mentions it “must be about the
best example one can find in the literature of a ‘rational recon-
struction’ masquerading as a ‘historical reconstruction”’ [5, p
285].
Mirowski [20, 21] explores the ’transition’ from classical po-
litical economy to neoclassical economics during the second
half of the 19th century, i.e. the so-called marginalist revolu-
tion. The often misleading expression ’revolution’ is frequently
applied by historians of economics because of the fundamental
changes introduced by the marginalists. The outstanding, lead-
ing marginalist authors of this period: William Stanley Jevons
[12], Léon Walras [23] and Carl Menger [19] concentrated, in
contrast to classical political economists, on the microfounda-
tions of economics. They postulated a utilitarian theory of value
and tried to create an abstract, yet precise language for their in-
vestigations to separate economic theory from the policy and
3According to Lakatos occasionally his methodology constitutes a narrower
scope for internal history: „For instance there may have been an experiment
which was accepted instantly – in the absence of a better theory – as the crucial
experiment. For the falsificationist such acceptance is part of internal history;
for me it is not rational and has to be explained in terms of external history”
[14, p 116].
4The illustration can be considered as the continuation or accomplishement
of the Lakatosian project, i.e the evaluation of methodologies with the help of a
presented history of science.
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business applications.
Mirowski [20,21] focused on the analogies between the struc-
tures of the theories of economics and physics, as well as on
the use of mathematics in economic theory. In his explanation
the main effect of the transition to marginalism is supported by
changes in contemporary physics: “[T]here was a readily identi-
fiable discontinuity in economic thought in the 1870s and 1880s
which was the genesis of neoclassical theory; and both its tim-
ing and intellectual content can be explained by parallel devel-
opments in physics in the mid-nineteenth century” [20, p 363].
Later he detailed his concept in a voluminous book [21], in
which he extended his scope. He also considered the neoclas-
sical theory of production in a separate chapter and broadened
his theory to include the period of classical political economy
by analysing the role of physical metaphors. In this paper let us
focus on his original idea concerning the neoclassical consump-
tion model.
The central element in Mirowski’s argumentation is the anal-
ysis of the structural and conceptual similarity between neo-
classical consumption theory and analytical mechanics5. First
he takes the canonic (as a matter of fact, also the actual6) form
of the two theories and gives a rational – what is more: formal –
reconstruction, in which he links physical and economic quanti-
ties (displacements7 and quantities to be consumed, forces and
prices, potential energy and utility, respectively) by designating
them with the same symbols. Following this formalisation he
shows that by applying the Hamiltonian principle of least ac-
tion8 – which is closely related to conservation principles – we
will obtain the crucial differential equation of motion (on a min-
imal energy level) in mechanics and the differential equation of
exchange9 (which provides maximal utility to agents) in eco-
nomics. Thus he concludes that the mathematical structures of
these theories are similar.
He bases his reconstruction on the work of Irving Fisher [10],
who actually dealt with the analogy between the two theories.
Concerning the conceptual similarity of analytical mechanics
and economics Mirowski only emphasizes the ‘mystic’ neoclas-
sical concept of utility:
“In exact parallel to the original concept of potential energy,
these utilities are unobservable and can only infered from theo-
5 The principal methods of analytical mechanics are suited to be generalized
to other fields of physics, but Mirowski (1984 and 1989) only uses mechanical
quantities in the reconstruction, although he argues for that physics of the 19th
century is not already mechanistic.
6 The relevant parts of analytical mechanics of the period do really not differ
too much from their present forms; this is not at all the case with respect to
neoclassical consumption theory.
7 More precisely generalized coordinates.
8 The Hamiltonian action function (the time integral of the difference of ki-
netic and potential energy) has a stationary point along the motion of the system,
or in other words the first variation of the Hamiltonian action function equals
zero.
9 The ratio of marginal utilities equals to the ratio of prices (under certain
technical conditions concerning the utility function to be analysed).
retical linkage to other observable variables” [20, p 368].
In his reconstruction Mirowski [20, 21] also investigates the
biography10 and publications of leading marginalists. On the
one hand, he shows that the majority of authors (Jevons, Wal-
ras, Pareto, Edgeworth, Antonelli) were more or less familiar
with physical theories of the period. On the other hand, by ex-
amining concrete texts, he emphasized that marginalists often
used physical metaphors in their explanations and wrote about
methodological similarities between the two disciplines.
To sum up the thesis, Mirowski [20, 21]intends to provide an
explanation by the detailed examination of the appearance of a
physical metaphor (1) to the origin of the ‘strange’ neoclassical
concept of utility, (2) to the mathematization (or the use of con-
ditional extremum calculus) of economic theory in the period
and (3) to the success11 and parallel discovery12 of neoclassical
theory.
Moreover, Mirowski addresses the question why Menger –
who is generally mentioned as a member of the marginalist ’tri-
umvirate’ – did not use any mathematics in his works, and why
Marshall – who is generally considered the person that clar-
ified and synthesized neoclassical theory – abandoned physi-
cal metaphors and used minimal mathematics in his famous
book [17]. Therefore, Mirowski [20, 21]discusses the role of
Menger13 and Marshall separately, and gives some additional
historical explanations.
Mirowski’s concept has at least two remarkable features. On
the one hand, when speaking about physical metaphors, he al-
ways refers simply to conservation principles (and in this man-
ner speaks generally about the “energetics metaphor”) and treats
extremum principles, field theory and conservation principles as
the same thing14. On the other hand, he expresses hard criti-
cism15 and makes several normative statements – based on the
actual state of neoclassical theory as the ’end product’ of the
development of economic thought – against certain neoclassi-
cal authors (mainly concerning their natural scientific compe-
tencies).
10Mirowski [20, 21] focuses mainly on letters and personal relations between
marginalists and (natural) scientists.
11 This is explained mainly by the declaration of physics-like scientific fea-
tures in economics.
12Jevons, Menger, and Walras published their works independently, in three
different languages in three different countries. At the time of publication there
was no contact among them.
13About the role of Menger, Mirowski [20]states that ”Austrians were not
neoclassicals” [20, p 370]
14 This identification is not at all evident, neither in mathematical, nor in his-
torical or philosophical [9]sense. Mirowski [20, 21]does not cite any argument
for the identification.
15 “[O]ne can venture a broad inductive generalization from past patterns:
that a substantial non-neoclassical economic theory will distinguish itself by
consciously repudiating the energetics metaphor” [20, p 377].
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The Mirowski-thesis as a historiographical research
programme
At this point let us reconsider Mirowski’s thesis explicitly in
Lakatosian terms, i.e. let us identify a historiographical research
programme, which deals with a scientific research programme.
According to the thesis, the central element of the neoclassi-
cal scientific research programme is the ‘energetics metaphor’
(classical field theoretical approach16 to conservation princi-
ples) as the hard core. The positive heuristics of the programme
consists of the annexion of the scientific methodology of physics
(and, as a consequence, the conditional extremum calculus), the
research of the analogous versions of physical concepts (in this
context, the introduction of a quantitative utility-concept and
the postulation of a special utilitarian theory of value) and, fi-
nally, the extension of the system to other fields of economic
problems, mainly to the production theory and the general equi-
librium theory. The negative heuristics of the programme sug-
gests avoiding the use of non-quantifiable economic concepts
and moral philosophical, normative statements. The transition
from the cardinal utility approach, which had a physiological
character, to the ordinal theory of utility can be considered as
the modification of the protective belt.
The hard core of Mirowski’s historiographical research pro-
gramme is that the crucial influence upon the formation and de-
velopment of certain economic theories is due to the energetics
metaphor. The positive heuristics of the programme is the in-
tention to historically explain the formation and development of
economic theories based on physical metaphors. The negative
heuristics can be avoiding the integration of those authors into
the marginalist group who did not apply mathematical tools (e.g.
Menger).
As mentioned in the previous section, the central element of
Mirowski’s rational reconstruction is the structural similarity be-
tween two canonic models. According to Lakatos, in all cases
when an author ’misunderstood’, ’incorrectly or not at all ap-
plied’ the energetics metaphor, the historian has to generate an
external historical explanation. These ’mistakes’ can thus be
appraised in the light of the internal history, which tells us how
things ought to have happened.
In the light of the above, the following normative statement
becomes adequate:
“When the physical metaphor is imported into social sphere,
neoclassicists were not at all precise about what the conserved
entity was, and they have not yet been able to settle this issue”
[20, p 374].
It is obvious that the latter problem is problematic only if
we use the metaphor of conservation principles as a starting
point. Mirowski [21]constantly departs from that methaphor
(fixation of the hard core) and, therefore, he finds no or con-
16 The earlier, substantial approach to conservation principles is the element
of the hard core of classical political economy (Mirowski 1989, 4th chapter), if
we broaden the Lakatosian reconsideration.
fused explications of a conservation principle made by earlier
marginalists17But the ‘correct explication’ has been found nei-
ther in the leading marginalists [21, p 250]nor in the case of
their followers [21, p 241].Hence, he accuses them of misunder-
standing the physical theory of the time. To confirm this, he cites
some disputes among marginalists and people well educated in
mathematics and physics18 Moreover, in a letter of Laurent, the
“most constructive person in the debates,” Mirowski thinks that
by reading between the lines he discovered an implicit (!) at-
tempt at the formulation of a conservation principle [21, p 247].
It is not evident whether it is reasonable to call these instances
’mistakes’ or ’misunderstandings’ and hence whether to con-
sider them parts of the external history, given that there is no
author who would confirm something that is claimed by the his-
torian to be the hard core of his historiographical research pro-
gramme. Let us examine another example to illustrate this point.
Mirowski’s rational reconstruction implies that the conserved
quantity is the sum of utility and expenditure in the neoclassical
system. According to Mirowski [21, p 242] the misunderstand-
ing of physical theory is manifested in the fact that if marginal-
ists had been able to identify this as the conserved quantity, then
they would have recognized that ontologically different quanti-
ties cannot be added to it.
Moreover, Fisher [10] made another ’mistake’ according to
Mirowski [21].He constructed a schedule to demonstrate eco-
nomic and physical analogies. Mirowski [21, p 225]’completes’
this schedule with four more items based on his own concept
(see Table 1).
The sum of utility and expenditure is analogous to the total en-
ergy, hence expenditure is analogous to kinetic energy. Allowing
for his additional items [21, p 228] considers Fisher’s analogy
between force and marginal utility a mistake19 (in his concept
force was analogous with price). Consequently, he brands again
something in the original historical document as a ’mistake’ in
order that the system of norms be fixed by his own historio-
graphical research programme.
According to the internal history one can assert that the neo-
classical scientific research programme is degenerating. Ac-
cording to the value judgement of Mirowski it is not ’substantial’
(or in Lakatosian terms: the empirical content is only slightly
corroborated), moreover, it is somewhat inconsistent or contains
a ‘category-mistake’ because ontologically different quantities
are added within it. Within the Lakatosian framework this is
a possible and plausible statement. But how can we appraise
Mirowski’s historiographical research programme?
17 In the case of Canard [21, p 202],Cournot [21, p 210] and Gossen [21, p
214].
18 Respectively: Walras-Bertrand [21, p 246], Walras-Laurent [21, p 244–
245], Pareto-Laurent [21, p 246]and Fisher-Gibbs [21, p 242].
19 Mirowski also considers as Fisher’s analogy between particle and individ-
ual a mistake, but that does not have any important consequence (individuals can
be identified with the vectors of consumed quantities or with their preferences,
as Mirowski suggests).
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Tab. 1.
Mechanics Economics
a particle an individual
Space Commodity
Force Marginal utility or disutility
Work Disutility
Energy Utility
Work or energy=force×space Utility=marginal utility×commodity
Force is a vector Marginal utility is a vector
Forces are added by vector addition Marginal utilities are added by vector addition
Work and energy are scalars Disutility and utility are scalars
The total energy may be defined as the integral with respect to impelling
forces.
The total utility enjoyed by the individual is the line integral with respect to
marginal utilities
Equilibrium will be where net energy (energy minus work) is maximum; or
equilibrium will be where impelling and resisting forces along each axis will
be equal.
Equilibrium will be where gain (utility minus disutility) is maximum; or equi-
librium will be where marginal utility and marginal disutility along each axis
are equal.
If total energy is substracted from total work instead of vice versa the dif-
ference is ”potential” and is a minimum.
If total utility is substracted from total disutility instead of vice versa the
difference may be called “loss” and is a minimum.
Component force along an axis is equilibrium Price of commodity in equilibrium
Kinetic energy Total expenditure
Displacement Incremental unit of commodity
Conservation of energy Conservation of utility plus expenditure
Mirowski [21, p 224–225] completes Fisher’s [20, p 85–86] schedule with the last four items.
If we had been able to make historical predictions in the
1870’s concerning the development of the relations between
physics and economics, based on the works of the leading
marginalists ’infected’ by physical metaphors, then this would
have indicated the progressivity of the historiographical research
programme. The fact that Fisher was indeed interested in an-
alyzing analogies between economics and physical theory 30
years after the marginalist revolution could be considered as
a corroborated historical prediction. But Fisher did not write
about conservation principles at all. According to Mirowski’s
assessment:
“What appears most striking about such a comparison is
that even Fisher, the most sophisticated scientist among the
nineteenth-century neoclassical economists, still displayed an
inadequate comprehension of the formalism of the energy con-
cept and, as corollary, a lack of appreciation of the metaphorical
dissonances involved. (. . . )
His chosen tactic was to avoid discussion of the conservation
of energy at all costs, even if it meant some misrepresentation of
the model appropriated from physics” [21, p 228-230].
Consequently, the coherence of the historiographical research
programme can be saved (only) by correcting these ’mistakes’
with the help of the internal history (see Mirowski’s addi-
tional items in Fisher’s schedule). But by doing so we have to
deem more and more historical facts parts of the external his-
tory, which means that the empirical content of the programme
shrinks.
At this point we have to pose the question whether it can re-
ally be regarded as “inadequate comprehension”, “avoided dis-
cussion” or “misinterpretation” from a scientist’s part if an ele-
ment that the historian considers essential is lacking from his
work. Moreover, it is possible to show that, within another
reconstruction20, Fisher’s analogies form a coherent system21
without using the conservation principle at all22. It seems to be
erroneous to suppose that Fisher made mistakes by disregarding
the metaphor of the energy concept and by forming his analo-
gies differently. He was simply concerned with something to-
tally different. However, it cannot be regarded as a ‘failure’
when a scientist follows a line of reasoning which is different
from that of the historian. Even if it were a failure, we would be
still facing a distortion of history.
In addition, if we compare Mirowski’s historiographical re-
search programme with other programmes and we do not ap-
praise it in itself, we face the problem of erecting a hierarchy
of historical facts. For example, let us consider Blaug’s his-
toriographical research programme. The hard core of this pro-
gramme is that marginalist revolution “was not an abrupt change
but only a gradual transformation of old ideas” [5, p 291] cen-
tred around the maximization principle.
In this framework, the use of physical metaphors becomes
20 The budget set is a holonomic schleronome constraint and consumed quan-
tities are analogous with simple space coordinates and not generalized coordi-
nates.
21 The hard core of the historiographical research programme would be worth
revising and it would make sense to distinguish the concept of extremum and
conservation principles because the earlier one is referred to in the original texts,
whereas the latter one is not (as Mirowski also objects).
22 The problem is probably caused by the delimitation and dynamics of the
system: “something must be conserved in order to apply the techniques of con-
strained extrema, the ’maximum principle”’ [20, p 374] . As mentioned, there
are no mathematical, philosophical or historical arguments for this statement.
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part of the external history, but Menger’s (and Marshall’s) work
is an important part of the internal history. Thus, the empirical
contents of the two historiographical research programmes are
totally different, and if we want to compare them, we have to
regard certain facts as more important than others. In order to
establish this hierarchy among facts we can turn to any historio-
graphical reserach programme, but we do not have any indepen-
dent guidelines.
Summary
In the preceding sections I provided a review and a form of
criticism of the Lakatosian historiography and his system of ap-
praisal. After having introduced the basic notions of Lakatos’
philosophy of science and historiography, I analyzed Lakatos’
train of thought concerning the appraisal of various historio-
graphical concepts and also the related scientific methodologies.
I illustrated my findings by introducing a historical case study
from the field of the history of economic thought. The case study
aimed at examining the types of problems arising when applying
a Lakatosian historiography. The rigid structure of the system of
appraisal implies that we have to consider certain historical (of-
ten not unimportant) facts mistakes or parts of external history,
which are thus not explained by the theory of scientific ratio-
nality. The amount of these facts increases drastically in case
we widen the extent of the historical period to be analyzed re-
garding the same historiographical research programme, i.e. the
programme gets inevitably degenerating.
Moreover, the situation will be worsened by the interpreta-
tion of hierarchy and prediction of historical facts. Interpreta-
tions based on an arbitrary rational reconstruction, determined
by some hard core dependent value judgement, are very similar
to what Lakatos himself called ’distortion of history’ in the case
of another system of criteria.
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